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I.

INTRODUCTION

While equal and unobstructed access to the civil court system has
been a hallmark of American jurisprudence, the increasing influence of
big business in redefining justice has led to the slow erosion of this
important Western tradition. Nowhere has this trend been more
prevalent than in the rapid explosion of arbitration clauses in
employment and consumer contracts. Crucial U.S. Supreme Court
decisions have lent a hand in shielding these clauses from attack, and
according to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “predictably resulted in the
deprivation of consumers’ rights to seek redress for losses . . . [while
insulating] powerful economic interests from liability for violations of
consumer-protection laws.”1
To be sure, arbitration is a legal procedure with a great deal of
beneficial, practical use. When used justly by informed parties with
equal bargaining power, it is a mechanism of great use. For instance,
proponents of arbitration often point to the frequent delays and
extremely lengthy procedure that are characteristic of already-burdened
civil litigation and cite arbitration’s expedited claim resolution process
as proof of its worth.2 In certain cases, arbitration can also be cheaper
than conventional litigation, allowing “companies to pass on to their
customers, in whole or in part, the lower dispute resolution costs they
incur as a result of arbitration.”3 Moreover, those advocating
arbitration also cite “simpler procedural and evidentiary rules,” and its
capacity to “[minimize] hostility and [be] less disruptive of ongoing . . .
1. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 193 L. Ed. 2d 365, 381 (2015) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
2. Contracts Against Public Policy: Hearing on A.B. 465 Before the S. Comm. on
Labor and Indus. Rel. (2015) (“[D]ata from the U.S. District Court Judicial Caseload
Profiler . . . shows that there were 29,312 civil cases filed in California in 2014. As of June
2014, approximately 2,132 cases had been pending in federal court in California for over
three years and the median time from filing of a civil complaint to trial in Northern
California was 31 months. Comparatively . . . a 2003 article in the New York University
School of Law legal journal regarding employment arbitration found that arbitration was
resolved within a year while litigation usually lasted over two years.”).
3. Brief of American Bankers Association, American Financial Services Association,
Consumer Bankers Association, Financial Services Roundtable and California Bankers
Association in Support of Petitioner as Amici Curiae at 14 citing Stephen J. Ware, Paying
the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J.
Disp. Resol. 89, 91–93, AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
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dealings among the parties.”4
Its advantages notwithstanding, the flavor of justice that the
modern arbitration system has created remains increasingly dangerous.
Binding arbitration decisions, though legally enforceable, usually do
not provide for a judicial appeals process,5 and existing law permits
arbitrators to disregard the law and/or the evidence in rendering their
decisions6 “without allowing for discovery, complying with the rules of
evidence, or explaining their decisions in written opinions.”7 The
arbitration framework is also largely unregulated, costly, and
“unreceptive to consumers”; employers often select the private
arbitration company who, in turn, chooses the arbitrators that are made
available for the parties to select from.8 This has created a “repeat
player advantage,” disadvantaging individual plaintiffs who are onetime participants in the arbitration system.9 The federal government, to
some extent, has recently acknowledged some of these ill-effects of
compelled arbitration by moving to ban such clauses in nursing home
contracts—contracts affecting a particularly vulnerable population.10
With these traits, it is hardly surprising that businesses are able to
exploit the process in their favor, leading to dispute resolution in
friendly confines and, ultimately, a perceived “privatization of the
justice system.”11 Encouraged by the Supreme Court’s decision in
4. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 97–542, at 13 (1982)).
5. Hearing on A.B. 465, supra note 2 (citing Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV,
Inc., 44 Cal. 4th 1334 (2008)).
6. Id. (citing Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 3 Cal. 4th 1 (1992)).
7. Id. (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. §§ 1283.1, 1282.2, 1283.4.); see also Jessica SilverGreenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice System’, N.Y.
Times (Nov. 1, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-thejustice-system.html (“Winners and losers are decided by a single arbitrator who is largely at
liberty to determine how much evidence a plaintiff can present and how much the defense
can withhold. To deliver favorable outcomes to companies, some arbitrators have twisted or
outright disregarded the law, interviews and records show.”).
8. Hearing on A.B. 465, supra note 2.
9. Id.
10. Rebecca Hersher, New Rule Preserves Patients’ Rights To Sue Nursing Homes In
Court, NPR (Sept. 29, 2016, 2:25 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/09/29/495918132/new-rule-preserves-patients-rights-to-sue-nursing-homes-incourt.
11. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the
Justice
System’,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
1,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-thejustice-system.html (“Arbitration records obtained by The Times showed that 41 arbitrators
each handled 10 or more cases for one company between 2010 and 2014”) (“[M]ore than
three dozen arbitrators described how they felt beholden to companies. Beneath every
decision, the arbitrators said, was the threat of losing business.”) (“Unfettered by strict
judicial rules against conflicts of interest, companies can steer cases to friendly arbitrators.
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AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,12 the problem of this reallocation of
adjudicatory authority to the private sphere has been compounded by
dramatic increases in the use of arbitration clauses to preclude plaintiffs
from resorting to class action litigation, with workers and consumers
bearing the brunt of this trend.13 A recent New York Times exposé has
elaborated on the true scope of this relatively recent development.
Federal class actions in which defendants filed a motion to compel
arbitration have increased from just below 100 in 2005 to well over 250
in 2014, with a grand total of over 1,700 such actions filed during that
time period.14 Out of those, the number of cases in which judges
actually ordered plaintiffs to arbitration correspondingly increased as
well, from around 50 in 2005, to nearly 140 in 2014.15 The Wall Street
Journal also recently reported that “companies using arbitration clauses
to preclude class-action claims soared to 43% [in 2014] from 16% in
2012.”16
The problem seems to be most acute within the labor sector, as
employment cases dominate the arbitration scene—there were 149
cases involving labor disputes from 2005 to 2009, and 470 from 2010
to 2014, an increase of 215%.17 Consumer contract and banking cases
followed labor disputes in arbitration relevance, with nearly 320 and
230 cases filed between 2005 and 2014, respectively.18 With regards to
workers, the fact remains that low-wage employees have very few
remedies to resort to when their rights are violated, and language
barriers that are particularly profound in such jobs prevent informed
agreements.19 Workers and consumers both are left with a system for
administering justice which allows financial behemoths like Wells

In turn, interviews and records show, some arbitrators cultivate close ties with companies to
get business.”).
12. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
13. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking
the
Deck
of
Justice,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
31,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stackingthe-deck-of-justice.html (“By inserting individual arbitration clauses into a soaring number
of consumer and employment contracts, companies like American Express devised a way to
circumvent the courts and bar people from joining together in class-action lawsuits,
realistically the only tool citizens have to fight illegal or deceitful business practices.”).
14. Robert Gebeloff & Karl Russell, Removing the Ability to Sue, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/30/business/dealbook/arbitration-trends.html.
15. Id.
16. Lauren Weber, More Companies Block Employees From Filing Suits, Wall St. J.
(Mar. 31, 2015, 1:51PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/more-companies-block-staff-fromsuing-1427824287.
17. Gebeloff & Russell, supra note 14.
18. Id.
19. Hearing on A.B. 465, supra note 2.
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Fargo, recently fined $185 million by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) for defrauding consumers, to defend
themselves by widespread manipulation of class-action waiver
clauses.20
This Comment will explore some of the solutions and avenues for
relief that the state of California is poised to offer its workers and
consumers—a state that has in recent years vigorously fought to test
the limits of federal pro-arbitration policy. It will begin by laying out
the foundation of this policy in Part II, discussing the Supreme Court’s
expansion of the Federal Arbitration Act through decisions like
Concepcion. Part II will also explore California’s response to this
trend by way of PAGA qui tam actions, along with other legislative
and executive attempts to address the proliferation of arbitration. Part
III will showcase how existing attempts to resolve this issue leave
much to be desired. Finally, in Part IV, this Comment investigates how
one sector of businesses, benefit corporations and B Corps, can take
leadership and build the momentum necessary for returning meaningful
court access to plaintiffs litigating against corporations in the face of
forced arbitration.
II. BACKGROUND AND ARBITRATION FOUNDATIONS
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
The Supreme Court’s interaction with the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) since the Act’s inception in 1925 has led to the precarious
situation consumers and employees find themselves in today. Thus, to
understand the omnipresent nature of arbitration arrangements within
the modern legal framework, along with California’s solutions to their
proliferation, it is important to begin with the FAA.
The circumstances and political climate surrounding the Act’s
adoption in 1925 were of a far different nature than that which is
present today. The legislation was originally enacted largely in
response to judicial enmity towards agreements that included
arbitration, a hostility that had roots in the colonial era.21 The
20. Emily Peck, The Infuriating Reason Wells Fargo Got Away With Its Massive Scam
For
So
Long,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Sept.
22,
2016,
4:55PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/wells-fargo-fraudrepublicans_us_57e4192be4b0e80b1ba0d583.
21. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011); see also Jodi
Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, 63
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 98 (2012) (“The FAA was conceived as a remedy for judicial
hostility toward arbitration agreements. This judicial hostility dated back to colonial times. It
was prevalent in both state and federal courts—reaching even the United States Supreme
Court[.]”).
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“revocability doctrine” was the norm before the FAA, where any party
to an arbitration agreement could object to arbitration and revoke its
agreement to arbitrate.22 Soon, the business community began to grow
frustrated with courts honoring the revocability of agreed-upon
arbitration and lobbied for change.23 The “revocability doctrine” was
eventually overruled, first with the New York Arbitration Act of 1920,
and then the FAA.24
The most important provision of the FAA, considering the
substantial attention it has garnered in Supreme Court opinions
interpreting it, is Section 2, referred to as the “primary substantive
provision”:25
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof,
or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
26
contract.

In other words, any agreement to arbitrate involving commerce is
held “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,” yet such agreements may be
invalidated for any reason that is applicable to contracts in general.27
This provision of the FAA, particularly the final clause discussing
grounds in which agreements to arbitrate may not be enforceable, has
been subject to close judicial parsing.
Notably, Congress may have never intended the FAA to apply to
employment contracts whatsoever. As one legal professor has stated
“[t]he statute was passed to address the problem of discrimination
against bargained-for arbitration agreements between merchants having
roughly equal bargaining power.”28 Employment contracts of adhesion
seem to lie, according to this description and taking into account
22. Wilson, supra note 21, at 98–99.
23. Id at 99.
24. Id. at 99-100.
25. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)
(describing the section as a “congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the
contrary.”).
26. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (LexisNexis 2015); see also Wilson, supra note 21, at 100 (“With this
provision, Congress intended to ensure that arbitration agreements occupied ‘the same
footing as other contracts.’”).
27. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
28. See Janet Cooper Alexander, To Skin a Cat: Qui Tam Actions as a State Legislative
Response to Concepcion, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1203, 1205 (2013).
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Congressional testimony of the time, entirely outside the original scope
of the FAA.29 The underlying issue this exposes is that the FAA’s
language “is arguably broader than the intent behind the statute as
expressed during the Congressional hearings” and this discrepancy has
led to Court expansion of FAA scope.30
Initial applications notwithstanding, while the unique and lowly
legal status of arbitration agreements in the early 20th century was the
primary catalyst for the FAA’s adoption, judicial interpretation of the
law has not only reinstated the enforceability of arbitration, but has
gone a step further to pave the way for a broader federal policy
favoring arbitration.31 This is demonstrated below.
B. The Supreme Court’s Expansion of the FAA: A Federal Policy of
Arbitration Favoritism
It was not until several decades after the FAA’s inception that this
policy began to substantively form. The first step was the Court
holding that arbitration clauses in contracts were indeed separable and
could be assessed independently from the contract at-large.32 This
indicated a shift elevating arbitration agreements’ legal status since
they were no longer on the “same footing as other contracts.”33 The
Court then resolved any doubts regarding the newly elevated status of
arbitration when it later declared that Section 2 of the FAA represented
“a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,
notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the
contrary.”34
29. See Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 67th Cong. 10 (1923) (statement of W.H.H. Piatt) (“It is the primary end of this
contract that it is a contract between merchants one with another, buying and selling
goods”). A careful reading of section 1 of the FAA might lead one to conclude that the law
does not even apply to employment contract. But see Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532
U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (holding that the exemption clause in Section 1 of the FAA only
exempted employment contracts of transportation workers, and not all workers).
30. Imre S. Szalai, Aggregate Dispute Resolution: Class and Labor Arbitration, 13
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 399, 439-40 (2008).
31. Wilson, supra note 21, at 101–02, (discussing how judicial wariness towards
arbitration did not immediately give way in the aftermath of the FAA’s adoption).
32. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 411 (1967).
33. Id. at 403–04 (allowing courts to enforce clauses compelling arbitration regardless
of the validity of the rest of the contract it was embedded in); see also id. at 423 (Black, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he separability rule which the Court applies to an arbitration clause does not
result in equality between it and other clauses in the contract.”) (also stating that the
question surrounding the making of an arbitration agreement should be determined with
reference to state and not federal law “formulated by judges for the purpose of promoting
arbitration”).
34. Moses, supra note 25, at 24-25 (justifying this new pronouncement by looking to
the fact that lower courts had been reaching this conclusion since Prima Paint, and stating
that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
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Very soon after Moses, the Court pivoted to the application of
FAA doctrine to conflicts with state law in Southland Corp. v.
Keating,35 a decision that typified the perennial conflict between
California courts and the Supreme Court on matters of arbitration.
There, the Court’s majority stated that the FAA was not only applicable
to state courts, but it also preempted conflicting state substantive law.36
Whether or not this new view of arbitration meshed well with
precedent was something Justice Sandra Day O’Connor was rather
alarmed with, believing that the majority was engaging in “judicial
revisionism.”37 Revisionism or not, Southland merely represents one in
a line of Supreme Court decisions addressing conflicts between
California law encouraging civil court proceedings and the FAA.
Class arbitration is another aspect of the FAA’s application that
has had increasing relevance in employment contracts. In Green Tree
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, a plurality of the Supreme Court vacated a
state court decision that ordered class arbitration when the arbitration
contract at issue was arguably silent on the issue.38 This, in turn, led to
lower courts, the American Arbitration Association, and arbitrators
treating Bazzle as setting forth an unquestioned holding that
“arbitrators, not courts, must determine whether an arbitration
agreement provides for class arbitration”39 and that “class actions may
be arbitrated when the agreement between the parties is silent on the
question.”40 Thus, the non-binding plurality opinion of Bazzle was
given too much subsequent weight, resulting in authorities interpreting
the decision to stand for principles it may have never been intended to
represent.41

arbitration”).
35. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
36. See id. at 15–16 (preempting California’s Franchise Investment Law, which was
interpreted by the California Supreme Court as calling for “judicial consideration of claims”
brought under its authority); see also id. at 10 (stating that, in enacting Section 2 of the
FAA, “Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of
the states to require a judicial forum”).
37. Id. at 36 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
38. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion) (Justice
John Paul Stevens issued a separate opinion explaining that the FAA did not preclude a state
court from determining that the agreements are silent regarding class arbitration and that
class arbitration is permissible. However, recognizing that adherence to his preferred
disposition would result in no controlling judgment, Justice Stevens concurred in the result
reached by the plurality.).
39. Szalai, supra note 30, at 403-04.
40. Id 404. (citing Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 262 (Ill. 2006)).
41. See id. at 406.
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C. The Concepcion Decision
The above cases, each buttressing a strong federal preference
towards arbitration, eventually led to one of the strongest
pronouncements of FAA authority in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion.42 Prior to the Supreme Court’s Concepcion decision, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court ruling that under substantive
California contract law and the rule announced in the California
Supreme Court decision in Discover Bank v. Superior Court,43 the
compelled arbitration clause of the contract was unconscionable and
not preempted by the FAA.44
The California Civil Code permits courts to refuse enforcement of,
or to limit the application of, any contract found “unconscionable at the
time it was made.”45 According to Discover Bank, class action waivers
in consumer contracts of adhesion are unconscionable when the “party
with the superior bargaining power” is said to have “carried out a
scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of
individually small sums of money.”46 In the Ninth Circuit’s review of
Discover Bank’s application, it found the rule was not preempted by
the FAA partly because the federal law was silent on traditional class
actions and class action arbitration,47 and also because the rule
represented a “principle of California law that does not specifically
apply to arbitration agreements, but to contracts generally.”48
In Concepcion, however, Supreme Court held that the Discover
Bank rule was in fact preempted by the FAA.49 This decision changed
42. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336-37 (2011) (citing App.
To Pet. For Cert. 61a) (involving a California cellular service contract of adhesion between
the vendor and a customer, which provided for arbitration and explicitly required any claims
arising out of that contract to be brought in an “individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or
class member in any purported class or representative proceeding”).
43. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005).
44. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 338; see also Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare
Servs., 24 Cal. 4th 83 (2000) (holding pre-dispute employment arbitration agreements, on
which employment is conditioned and that encompass unwaivable statutory rights, are valid
and enforceable as long as the following contractual protections are included: (1) provide for
a neutral arbitrator; (2) no limitation of remedies; (3) adequate opportunity to conduct
discovery; (4) written arbitration award and judicial review of the award; and (5) no
requirement for the employee to pay unreasonable costs that he would not incur in litigation
or arbitration).
45. Cal. Civ. Code § 1670.5(a) (West 2015).
46. Discover Bank, 36 Cal. 4th at 162-63 .
47. Id. at 163-65.
48. Id. at 165 (noting that the rule did not run afoul of the FAA’s savings clause).
49. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343 (“[N]othing in [Section 2’s saving clause] suggests an
intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
FAA’s objectives.”); see also id. at 348 (stating that requiring the availability of class
arbitration would profoundly frustrate the purpose of arbitration by sacrificing its useful
informality, making the process slower, more costly, and more likely to “generate
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how businesses could avoid class proceedings, since states were now
helpless when trying to “protect the other party through substantive
rules of contract law.”50 Class actions have historically been an
advantageous avenue for employees and consumers to expose
widespread corporate mismanagement, while aggregating small claims
to punish large businesses where it hurts them most: their pockets.51
Now, while certain class waivers might be considered legally
unconscionable in agreements without arbitration clauses, businesses
can evade plaintiffs’ class litigation by simply including arbitration
clauses in their agreements.52 How this resulting expansion of the FAA
meshes with the law’s original intent—to eliminate judicial hostility by
ensuring that arbitration agreements are enforced on equal footing with
other contracts—is seriously questionable.53
The cases that followed Concepcion also illustrate the immensely
influential nature of that decision. In American Express v. Italian
Colors, the Supreme Court held that class action waivers contained in
mandatory arbitration clauses were valid even if plaintiffs could prove
that it would not be financially feasible to maintain these actions
individually.54 Most recently, the Supreme Court heard another case
involving a contract construed by California courts to be
unconscionable due to a clause waiving class-wide arbitration.55 There,
the Court predictably reversed the California decision, holding that
such a conclusion did not “place arbitration contracts ‘on equal footing

procedural morass” while greatly increasing the risks to defendants in the process).
50. Alexander, supra note 28, at 1204.
51. See id. at 1207 (“Classwide procedures have provided significant public policy
benefits in resolving disputes across a broad range of subject areas by making it
economically feasible to enforce legal rules in small-dollar transactions, thereby providing
deterrence, compensation, and a supplement to governmental enforcement efforts.”).
52. See Wilson, supra note 21, at 123; see also Myriam Gilles, AT&T Mobility vs.
Concepcion: From Unconscionability to Vindication of Rights, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 15,
2011, 4:25 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/att-mobility-vs-concepcion-fromunconscionability-to-vindication-of-rights (“[The Concepcion] ruling is the real gamechanger for class action litigation, as it permits most of the companies that touch consumers’
day-to-day lives to place themselves beyond the reach of aggregate litigation by simply
incorporating class waiver language into their standard-form contracts.”).
53. See Wilson, supra note 21, at 100–01 (describing the original intent of the FAA).
54. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); see also
Salvatore U. Bonaccorso, State Court Resistance to Federal Arbitration Law, 67 STAN L.
REV. 1145, 1155 (2015) (stating that the ruling in Italian Colors stands for the proposition
that a “congressional preference for arbitration could frustrate the vindication of a
competing federal right [the effective vindication rule]”); see also Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct.
at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he FAA was never meant to produce this outcome . . .
In the hands of today’s majority, arbitration threatens to become . . . a mechanism easily
made to block the vindication of meritorious federal claims and insulate wrongdoers from
liability.”).
55. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 193 L. Ed. 2d 365, 370 (2015).
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with all other contracts’”56 and thus did not give “due regard . . . to the
federal policy favoring arbitration.”57 It was now dreadfully clear that
if California wanted to alter the post-Concepcion arbitration and classaction landscape to return some semblance of power and leverage to
those embroiled in litigation against large businesses, it would have to
resort to other means.
D. California Strikes Back: The Private Attorney General Act
Fortunately for workers shackled by employment contracts,
California courts’ repeated unsuccessful attempts to side with
employees in the arbitration battle did not result in judges bowing to
the FAA once and for all.58 For example, in Chavarria v. Ralphs
Grocery Co., the Ninth Circuit found an arbitration clause in an
employment contract procedurally and substantively unconscionable
and thus unenforceable.59 Invalidating the clause in question on
conscionability grounds was not preempted by the FAA because
“California law regarding unconscionable contracts, as applied in this
case, is not unfavorable towards arbitration, but instead reflects a
generally applicable policy against abuses of bargaining power.”60
Navigating between the Court’s decisions in Concepcion and Italian
Colors to reach this decision was especially tricky for the Ninth
Circuit.61

56. Id. at 375 (citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443
(2006)).
57. Imburgia, 193 L. Ed. 2d at 375 (citing Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989)); see also id. at 374 (The fact that Imburgia
seemed to directly fly in the face of the Court’s holding just a few years prior in Concepcion
was not ignored by the Justices at oral argument or in writing the majority opinion.) (“[T]he
view that state law retains independent force even after it has been authoritatively
invalidated by this Court is one courts are unlikely to accept.”); see also Ronald Mann,
Opinion analysis: Justices rebuke California courts (again) for refusal to enforce
arbitration
agreement,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Dec.
14,
2015,
2:08
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/12/opinion-analysis-justices-rebuke-california-courtsagain-for-refusal-to-enforce-arbitration-agreement/ (“Breyer mused at argument that, despite
his dissent from Concepcion, this case seemed to follow so closely upon it that a contrary
ruling amounted to little more than evasion of the earlier case.”) (“[R]eader can sense the
Justices’ bristling sensitivity to the lower court’s casual rejection of the Concepcion
opinion”).
58. In some scenarios after Concepcion, California courts had little choice but to
accede to FAA preemption; see Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC 61 Cal. 4th 899,
923–24 (2015)(finding class action waivers enforceable in a consumer automobile sales
contracts and that the anti-waiver provision of the California Legal Remedies Act is
preempted as it pertains to an arbitration agreement covered by the FAA.).
59. See Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co. 733 F.3d 916, 926 (9th Cir. 2013).
60. Id. at 927 (also stating that “[f]ederal law favoring arbitration is not a license to tilt
the arbitration process in favor of the party with more bargaining power”).
61. Id. at 926–27.
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The PAGA as a Concepcion Work-Around

Regardless of Chavarria, it remained incredibly difficult for
employees to litigate as a class against large businesses when contracts
called for mandated arbitration. Eventually, however, one provision of
California law, the Private Attorney General Act (PAGA),62 emerged
as a promising means for workers to make use of certain elements of
class action, while evading federal arbitration preemption. The PAGA,
an iteration of the traditional qui tam action, authorizes an employee to
“bring an action for civil penalties on behalf of the state against his or
her employer for Labor Code violations committed against the
employee and fellow employees, with most of the proceeds of that
litigation going to the state.”63
The PAGA was enacted in response to a number of issues, one of
which was labor compliance.64 To encourage this, the PAGA
empowered “aggrieved employees, acting as private attorneys general,
to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations, with the
understanding that labor law enforcement agencies were to retain
primacy over private enforcement efforts.”65 In other words, the
PAGA permits employees to bring civil actions personally and “on
behalf of” other employees for Labor Code violations.66 For our
purposes, the most significant aspects of the PAGA are its potential to
parallel the traditional use of aggregative litigation, while operating in
a gray area of FAA preemption of state laws that favor class action.
PAGA claims are similar to class actions in that they also permit
private individuals “to sue for violations affecting a group of similarly
situated persons and to recover an amount based on the aggregate harm
to the group,” but its nuanced differences from traditional class actions
have allowed PAGA claims to evade FAA preemption thus far.67
Concepcion did not apply to PAGA actions because they were
representative actions, often brought in counts wholly separate from
class claims, and as such did not preclude individual actions in addition

62. Cal. Lab. Code § 2698 et seq. (West 2015).
63. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 360 (2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 1155 (2015); see also Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(i) (West 2015) (stating that
75% of recovered civil penalties go to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency, and
the remaining 25% go towards the aggrieved employees).
64. Iskanian, supra note 63, at 379 (stating that in the scenario where civil penalties
were available there remained “a shortage of government resources to pursue enforcement”).
65. Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 969, 980 (2009).
66. Cal. Lab. Code, § 2699(a) (West 2015); see also Arias, 46 Cal. 4th at 986
(describing plaintiffs acting essentially as proxies of “state labor law enforcement
agencies”).
67. Alexander, supra note 28, at 1226.
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to PAGA claims.68 Thus, and partly due to this fact, PAGA actions do
not amount to an “aggregation of individual claims” and do not involve
private compensation at all—distinct characteristics of the traditional
class action.69 The plaintiff does not “vindicate a private right” but
rather litigates a claim for the public benefit as a proxy of the state with
penalties payable to and collectable by the state.70 It is through this
deputization of citizens as private attorneys enforcing the labor code
that the PAGA avoids falling within the ambit of the FAA.71
Due to the PAGA’s potential to inflict broader liability on
businesses, it was only natural that they soon incorporated PAGA
claim waivers in their contracts. Such waivers raised serious states’
rights concerns by “[a]llowing private employers to nullify the
legislature’s chosen means of enforcing the labor code.”72 Soon
enough, these PAGA waivers were challenged by aggrieved employees
in court, and once again, federal preemption loomed large.
2.

The Iskanian and Luxottica Decisions

The California Supreme Court decision in Iskanian v. CLS
Transportation73 represents key case law on the enforceability of
contractual PAGA claim waivers. There, an employee for CLS
Transportation brought claims in a representative capacity under
PAGA for Labor Code violations, despite signing an arbitration
agreement pledging not to assert “class action or representative action
claims” that may “represent the interests of any other person.”74 The
California Supreme Court invalidated, on FAA preemption grounds,
the state rule striking down class action waivers in certain
circumstances,75 a partial victory for business. However, it also
68. See id.
69. Id. at 1226–28 (also stating that “[a] private plaintiff cannot bring a PAGA suit
based solely on violations with respect to herself, but must sue to recover penalties for
violations against the whole group”) (noting that PAGA actions “do not present the issues of
notice, due process, and commonality that the Supreme Court considered beyond the ken of
arbitrators [in Concepcion]”).
70. Id. at 1228.
71. See Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 197 Cal. App. 4th 489, 501-02 (2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct 1910 (2012).
72. Alexander, supra note 28, at 1233.
73. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 360 (2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 1155 (2015).
74. Id. at 360–61.
75. Id. at 364–66 (invalidating the rule announced in Gentry that a trial court must
invalidate a class action waiver when “a class arbitration is likely to be a significantly more
effective practical means of vindicating the rights of the affected employees than individual
litigation or arbitration, and [whether] the disallowance of the class action will likely lead to
a less comprehensive enforcement of [labor or employment] laws for the employees alleged
to be affected by the employer’s violations”). Id. at 364 (quoting Gentry v. Superior Court,
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concluded that waiver of representative claims under the PAGA is
“contrary to public policy and unenforceable as a matter of state law.”76
More importantly though, these waivers were not deemed
preempted by the Court’s decision in Concepcion and/or the FAA.77
The Court believed that the FAA’s focus on private disputes and not
those between an employer and a state agency allowed the PAGA to
escape falling within the realm of the FAA.78 Also echoing Professor
Alexander’s federalism concerns, the Court expressed the belief that, in
its view, the FAA was not intended “to curtail the ability of states to
supplement their enforcement capability by authorizing willing
employees to seek civil penalties for Labor Code violations
traditionally prosecuted by the state.”79 It was clear that Iskanian
represented movement in the right direction for defining the outer
limits of FAA reach.
It did not take very long for the rule announced in Iskanian to be
challenged up to the Ninth Circuit in Sakkab v. Luxottica,80 the most
recent and clearest indication of the unenforceability of representative
PAGA claim waivers. Like the California Supreme Court before it,
here too the Ninth Circuit was confronted with questions of FAA
preemption and it ultimately reached the same conclusion the court
reached in Iskanian: pre-dispute agreements to waive PAGA claims are
invalid, and preventing their enforcement is not preempted by the
FAA’s preference for arbitration.81
To reach this decision upholding the Iskanian rule, the Ninth
Circuit looked primarily to two elements of the FAA: the saving clause
in Section 2 of the FAA,82 and the rule’s compatibility with the FAA’s
purposes.83 The Act’s saving clause states that the Iskanian rule must
be a “[ground] . . . for the revocation of any contract” if it is to preclude
the default irrevocable nature of arbitration clauses.84 The Ninth
Circuit held that the rule was generally applicable to all contracts
because it barred waiver of PAGA claims without regard to their
presence in an arbitration or non-arbitration contract.85
42 Cal. 4th 443, 463 (2007)).
76. Id. at 383-84.
77. Id. at 387–89.
78. Id. at 384-85; see also Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 387 (“The fact that any judgment in
a PAGA action is binding on the government confirms that the state is the real party in
interest.”).
79. Id. at 388.
80. Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 427 (9th Cir. 2015).
81. See id. at 427.
82. Id. at 432; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2.
83. Luxottica, 803 F.3d at 433.
84. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
85. Luxottica, 803 F.3d at 432.
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Yet, following the logic in Concepcion, a generally applicable
contract defense like the Iskanian rule might still be preempted if it
conflicts with the purposes of the FAA.86 One such purpose, as
described above, is to overcome judicial hostility to arbitration.87 The
Luxottica court believed that the Iskanian rule did not frustrate this
purpose because the rule does not express a preference for whether
PAGA claims are litigated or arbitrated.88 Another purpose of the
FAA, to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to
their terms,89 was also not contravened since the rule did not “diminish
parties’ freedom to select informal arbitration procedures.”90 Because
PAGA actions do not vindicate absent employees’ claims, do not
require special procedures, and are merely actions for penalties brought
by employees as proxies of the state, parties are still free “to select the
arbitration procedures that best suit their needs.”91
PAGA claims seemed to have weathered the FAA preemption
storm for now,92 and this could serve to embolden their use in
California, as well as legitimize qui tam actions as a Concepcion workaround in other states. We have already seen the impact of the
Iskanian and Luxottica decisions in other, highly publicized, pending
litigation. Shortly after the Luxottica decision was handed down,
attorneys for both parties in O’Connor v. Uber Technologies,93
involving the certification of a colossal class of nearly 160,000 current
and former Uber drivers, were asked to weigh in on the relevance of
the Luxottica decision to the class certification in their own case.94
After their briefing, the District Court Judge issued an order stating
that, given precedent in Iskanian and Luxottica, Uber’s blanket PAGA
waiver in its contract was not only unenforceable, but also
unseverable.95 As such, the whole arbitration agreement was also
86. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011).
87. Luxottica, 803 F.3d at 434.
88. Id.
89. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344 (2011) (citing Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
90. Luxottica, 803 F.3d at 435-36.
91. Id. at 436-37; see also id. at 439-40 (stating that while qui tam actions might be
difficult to arbitrate, that does “not mean that the FAA requires courts to enforce private
agreements opting out of the state’s chosen method of enforcing its labor laws”).
92. Daniel Wiessner, Business groups urge 9th Circuit to rethink ruling on PAGA
waivers, REUTERS (Nov. 25, 2015, 6:10 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/employmentwaivers-idUSL1N13K2IG20151125.
93. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 311 F.R.D. 547 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
94. Daniel Wiessner, Judge urged to reconsider Uber driver class after 9th Circuit
ruling, REUTERS, (Nov. 12, 2015, 6:41 AM) http://www.reuters.com/article/employmentuber-idUSL1N1370Q220151112.
95. O’Connor, 311 F.R.D. at 550-551, 555-556 (order granting in part and denying in
part plaintiffs’ supplemental motion for class certification).
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unenforceable.96 The effect of this conclusion was the certification of
an entire subclass, a move sure to impact the litigation going forward.97
E. PAGA Shortcomings: A Formidable Counter to Concepcion That
Does Not Go Far Enough
Luxottica is undoubtedly an important and guiding decision for
legislators and other states trying to fill the deterrence gap created by
Concepcion. With elements of traditional class action, employees are
now better equipped to make use of some semblance of aggregate
litigation in order to hold businesses accountable. However, even if
qui tam procedures like those authorized by the PAGA continue to be
used in California and take root nationally, there remains a substantial
chunk of legal remedies that are still foreclosed to employees and
consumers in the wake of Concepcion.
For one, make no mistake that PAGA claims, while similar, are
not traditional class actions, and thus lack many valuable aspects of
conventional Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 2398 suits, such as
their rigorous procedural safeguards and applicability to a wider range
of legal liability that falls outside of the PAGA’s strict labor code
jurisdiction.99 Additionally, because PAGA actions do not aggregate
individual claims, the amount of potential damages are arguably not as
substantial as that found with regular class actions,100 and parties could
still be subject to arbitration on claims not authorized by the PAGA.101
The fact of the matter is that the underlying legal problem
remains: businesses employing pre-dispute contracts with arbitration
clauses to prevent meaningful access to courts by plaintiffs, whether by
precluding class litigation or forcing arbitration procedures, are
essentially free to continue doing so. Absent any meaningful
leadership or market forces driving out the use of these contract
clauses, corporations are not compelled to change the status quo. At
best, the PAGA only nibbles at FAA and Concepcion preemption
framework, and only in the realm of class action. It still does not touch
private, individualized grievances that an employee-plaintiff wants to
litigate in court but cannot.

96. Id. at 555-556.
97. Id.
98. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. (West 2015).
99. See Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 435-436 (9th Cir. 2015)
(discussing the procedural differences between FRCP Rule 23 and the PAGA).
100. Id. at 437.
101. Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(a) (West 2015) (describing PAGA’s applicability to Labor
Code violations).
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III. ALTERNATIVE ATTEMPTS TO REIN IN CONCEPCION:
LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE ATTEMPTS
This is not to say there have not been alternative, more
comprehensive attempts to restore court access to plaintiffs while
skirting Supreme Court precedent. In California itself, the legislature
has tried to pass several bills trying to rein in the proliferation of unfair
arbitration clauses. In 2011, Senator Noreen Evans introduced Senate
Bill 491, which aimed at rendering void terms of adhesion contracts
that waived the “right to join or consolidate claims or to bring a claim
as a representative . . . in a private attorney general capacity.”102 This
bill was soundly defeated in committee.103
More recently, in February 2015, Assemblyman Roger Hernandez
introduced Assembly Bill 465, a far more comprehensive proposal than
S.B. 491. This new bill set out the principle that any waivers of legal
rights should be “knowing and voluntary and in writing, and expressly
not made as a condition of employment.”104 Among other things, the
bill also placed the burden of proving “knowing and voluntary”
waivers on the employer,105 made requiring arbitration agreements as a
condition to employment per se invalid,106 and afforded employees who
were successful in invalidating agreements the right to recover
attorneys’ fees.107 The bill managed to pass both houses and was
enrolled before eventually being vetoed by Governor Brown in October
2015.108 In justifying his veto, Governor Brown cited the far-reaching
nature of the bill, along with the preemptive potential of pending
litigation in the U.S. Supreme Court.109
On a national scale there is a history of federal bills trying to limit
Concepcion that have reached a similar fate to the legislative attempts
in California. In fact, Senator Al Franken announced intentions to reintroduce the Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA) on the very day
Concepcion was handed down.110 This legislation would have
102. S.
491
(2011),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_04510500/sb_491_bill_20120430_amended_asm_v97.html.
103. Cheryl Miller, Legislation to Blunt “Concepcion” Is Killed in State Assembly, THE
RECORDER
(July
3,
2012),
http://www.therecorder.com/id=1202561826154?keywords=Cheryl+Miller&publication=Th
e+Recorder&elementType=Article.
104. Contracts Against Public Policy: A.B. 465 § 2(c) (2015).
105. Id. at § 2(e).
106. Id. at §§ 2(a), 2(d).
107. Id. at § 2(g).
108. Margot Roosevelt, Gov. Brown vetoes bill that would have protected workers’ right
to
sue
employers,
OC
REGISTER
(Oct.
12,
2015,
11:56
PM),
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/brown-687230-arbitration-workers.html.
109. Id.
110. Alexander, supra note 28, at 1209.
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amended the FAA to invalidate all pre-dispute arbitration agreements
in consumer, employment, and civil rights actions, essentially
rendering the FAA inapplicable to such agreements.111 In other words,
the AFA sought to recalibrate the FAA’s scope to fall in line with the
Act’s original purpose and intention.112 Unfortunately though, the
AFA failed to gain bi-partisan support and died in committee.113
Stepping away from the legislature, federal agencies, most notably
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), have also
committed themselves to finding solutions to the problems Concepcion
introduced. As authorized by the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFPB is
permitted to “study the use of pre-dispute arbitration in consumer
contracts for financial products or services and to submit a report to
Congress.”114 In March 2015, the Bureau released a three-year, 700
page study demonstrating the surprising pervasiveness of arbitration
clauses, how such clauses can act as a barrier to class actions, and the
exorbitant costs arbitration has imposed on employees and
consumers.115 Soon after that report’s release, in May 2016, the CFPB
formally published a proposed rule prohibiting “companies from
putting mandatory arbitration clauses in new contracts that prevent
class action lawsuits.”116 The proposal also requires “companies with
arbitration clauses to submit to the CFPB claims, awards, and certain
related materials that are filed in arbitration cases,” in order to facilitate

111. Id. at 1209-10.
112. Id. at 1210–211.
113. Id. at 1211; see also H.R. 2087: Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, GOV TRACK (Apr.
29, 2015), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr2087 (noting a version of the AFA
that was again reintroduced in April 2015 and at the time this comment was written, is in
committee); see also Alexander, supra note 28, at 1211–212 (discussing the Fair Arbitration
Act of 2011, which “would have amended the FAA to require that any arbitration clause
have a heading printed in bold capital letters, state whether arbitration is mandatory or
elective, provide a contact for a consumer to inquire about costs, fees, and forms required
for participation, and state that a consumer or employee may proceed in small claims court
rather than arbitration”).
114. Alexander, supra note 28, at 1215–216 (citing 12 U.S.C.S. § 5518(b)) (stating that
CFPB has “broad authority to promulgate regulations to ‘prohibit or impose conditions or
limitations’ on pre-dispute arbitration clauses in contracts for consumer financial products or
services ‘if the Bureau finds that such a prohibition or imposition of conditions or
limitations is in the public interest and for the protection of consumers’”).
115. CFPB Study Finds That Arbitration Agreements Limit Relief for Consumers,
Consumer
Financial
Protection
Bureau
(Mar.
10,
2015),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-study-finds-that-arbitration-agreementslimit-relief-for-consumers/.
116. CFPB Proposes Prohibiting Mandatory Arbitration Clauses that Deny Groups of
Consumers their Day in Court, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (May 5, 2016),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protectionbureau-proposes-prohibiting-mandatory-arbitration-clauses-deny-groups-consumers-theirday-court/.
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greater transparency in this area.117 This proposal has been highly
divisive and had garnered nearly 13,000 public comments as of August
2016.118
Regrettably, despite the promising and optimistic outlook of
CFPB proposals, there remains a good chance the Bureau’s proposals
will be toothless and in vain. Firstly, the Bureau’s authority is confined
to contracts for consumer financial products and do not cover
employment contracts, a substantial area of law desperately needing
protection from forced arbitration.119 Moreover, there is still “no
private right of action to enforce violations of CFPB rules,” and any
Bureau proposal still has a good probability of being struck down by
the Supreme Court as attempting to reverse Concepcion.120
All of this goes to show that any real hope of empowering
consumers and employees in the aftermath of Concepcion will likely
not be dependent on federal or state legislation, mainly due to the
inability to gain consistent bi-partisan support. Combine those
prospects with the use of PAGA and qui tam actions that only go so far
to chip away at FAA preemption, and we are left desperately needing
another route to empower those litigating against the boundless
resources of corporations.
Such a route should begin and end with these businesses
themselves, institutions that have thus far been mostly absent and
unengaged with regards to working out solutions to the problem of
unfettered arbitration. Undoubtedly, businesses themselves have
played a front-and-center role in the development of federal policy
favoring arbitration, as they have always been unabashedly mobilized
in favor of private claims resolution.121 However, given that the
potential legislative, executive, and judicial solutions addressed above
are either doomed to failure or severely deficient, if the problem of
arbitration is to truly improve, businesses must play a role in their
demise and take responsibility for the status quo. Once this is done,
more workable and viable solutions to this legal dilemma will follow.
Interestingly, there is one very promising sector of the business
community that holds a key to ameliorating the crisis of unequal access
to justice vis-à-vis arbitration.

117. Id.
118. Yuka Hayashi, CFPB’s Arbitration Proposal Draws 13,000 Comments, WALL ST.
J. (Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cfpbs-arbitration-proposal-draws-13-000comments-1471983139.
119. Alexander, supra note 28, at 1216.
120. Id. at 1216-17 (also discussing the impact of Republican opposition to the CFPB as
hindering its effectiveness).
121. See supra Part II(A).
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IV. THE OPPORTUNITY FOR BUSINESSES TO RETURN
LITIGANTS’ ACCESS TO COURTS
Businesses, particularly socially conscious “benefit corporations”
and related entities, have altogether been much too silent on the
increasingly relevant issue of forced arbitration. This has been in spite
of their alleged commitment to the general public welfare in addition to
bottom lines. Sure, businesses have already begun very publicly
championing commitment to other worthwhile social causes ranging
from environmental sustainability to fair pay and humane working
conditions, but the list should not end there. This Part will explore the
potential for benefit corporations to provide desperately needed
business-centered leadership and accountability for consumers’ and
workers’ deplorable access to courts.
A. Benefit Corporations and B Corps: Socially Conscious Institutions
Professor of business administration R. Edward Freeman created
waves in 1984 when he released his book Strategic Management: A
Stakeholder Approach, outlining the now well-known stakeholder
approach to business management.122 Following in the footsteps of
Harvard Law Professor E. Merrick Dodd’s seminal article For Whom
Are Corporate Managers Trustees, this methodology focuses on
managing the multitude of “stakeholders” of a business venture and
infuses business with a sense of morality and social value.123
According to the stakeholder theory, businesses should not solely focus
on its shareholders and profit maximization, but should also look to
incorporate the opinions of, and cater to, the multitude of a venture’s
stakeholders, which often include the surrounding community.124 This
eye towards managing stakeholders versus shareholders eventually
contributed to the emergence of the socially conscious “benefit
corporation,” and it is here where issues of social justice and access to
courts can take root.
Considered by some the “most ascendant social enterprise
innovation today,”125 benefit corporations owe their advent largely to
the efforts of the founders of B Lab, a non-profit organization created

122. R. Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1984.
123. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1365 (1931).
124. R. Edward Freeman, Andrew C. Wicks & Bidhan Parmar, Stakeholder Theory and
“The Corporate Objective Revisited,” 15 ORGANIZATION SCIENCE, 364 (2004).
125. Steven Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance
Mechanisms Can Enhance the Innovative New Business Form, 7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y
170, 171 (2012).
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in 2006 that sought to “[use] the power of business to solve social or
environmental problems.”126 This new organization was trying to
address “[t]he existence of shareholder primacy which makes it
difficult for corporations to take employee, community, and
environmental interests into consideration when making decisions.”127
A year after its founding, B Lab started certifying companies as
“Certified B Corporations” if they scored appropriately in their “B
Impact Assessment” (BIA), which evaluates a company’s impact in a
range of areas like governance, employees, and community.128 As B
Lab began its certification of socially conscious companies, its
founders also began lobbying a number of states to pass benefit
corporation legislation incorporating benefit corporation legal structure
to existing corporate codes, with Maryland being the first state to do so
in 2010.129 California’s own benefit corporation statute was passed in
2012, and, an astounding thirty-one states have passed benefit
corporation legislation to date, with laws in seven other states currently
pending.130
Benefit corporations are attractive to companies for a host of
reasons. For one, their structure allows directors and others in
positions of power more flexibility to take into consideration the
impact of their decisions on a venture’s multiple stakeholders—not
merely its shareholders.131 This, in turn, might reduce director liability
in certain circumstances.132 The corporation’s fiduciary duties to its
shareholders133 have the potential to, at times, run counter to the views
of certain important stakeholders. Achieving benefit corporation status
might also be an advantage for cutting-edge companies trying to attract
talent, especially considering the fact that 77% of millennials, who will
grow to 75% of the workforce by 2025, say their “company’s purpose
was part of the reason they chose to work there.”134 Investors are also
126. Kyle Westaway & Dirk Sampselle, The Benefit Corporation: An Economic
Analysis with Recommendations to Courts, Boards, and Legislatures, 62 EMORY L.J. 999,
1011 (2013).
127. Id. (citing Introducing the B Corporation, B Revolution Consulting 4 (May 15,
2012), http://www.brevolutionconsulting.com/assets/BCorp-Intro-pack.pdf.).
128. J. Haskell Murray, Defending Patagonia: Mergers and Acquisitions with Benefit
Corporations, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 485, 488–89 (2013); see infra note 138, 139.
129. Id. at 489.
130. State by State Status of Legislation. BENEFIT CORPORATION – POWERED BY B LAB.
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status.
131. See generally Why is Benefit Corp Right For Me? BENEFIT CORPORATION –
POWERED BY B LAB http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/why-become-benefit-corp.
132. Id.
133. Cal. Corp. Code §309(a); see supra note 123.
134. Id. (citing The Deloitte Millennial Survey: January 2014 Executive Summary,
DELOITTE,
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/AboutDeloitte/gx-dttl-2014-millennial-survey-report.pdf.).
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attracted to these corporations given their “increased legal protection,
accountability and [mission] transparency. . .”135 Mandated annual
benefit reports, described below, can also streamline investor due
diligence.136
It is important to note here the distinction between B Corporations
on one hand, and benefit corporations on the other. B Corporations are
existing institutions privately certified by B Lab, while benefit
corporations are new corporate entities authorized under specific state
corporate law.137 More nuanced differences between these two forms
of socially responsible entities are highlighted below.
1.

B Corps and B Lab Certification

In order to become a B Lab certified “B Corporation” or “B Corp”
companies must: “take a “B Impact Assessment,” pass an assessment
review, submit required documentation, adopt B Lab’s amendments to
their articles of incorporation, and pay B Lab a certification fee.”138
The BIA itself forms the foundation of B Lab’s certification process
and consists of a number of questions covering sectors that include
business governance, community impact, environment, and workers.139
Once a B Corp is certified as such, it is subject to randomly selected
on-site reviews vis-à-vis B Lab’s private regulatory scheme and must
also go through the process above every two years to maintain
certification status.140 Additionally, there is no special tax treatment for
B Corps, and certification does not grant stakeholders any private right

135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Robert Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A Primer on
Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe and the United States and the Case for the Benefit
Corporation, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 639, 695 (2013).
138. Id. at 696; see also How to Become a B Corp, CERTIFIED B CORPORATIONS,
http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp.
139. See generally B Lab Demo Account Assessment (Nov. 19, 2015) http://blab.force.com/bcorp/PrintImpactAssessment?id=a03C000000ISIohIAH; see also Dana
Brakman Reiser, The Sustainable Corporation: Article: Benefit Corporations – A
Sustainable Form of Organization? 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 601–02 (2011) (“[B
Lab’s] survey and audit processes are fully documented online and thus appear to fit the
transparency requirements, and B Lab will be independent of any unrelated potential
incorporators. B Lab evaluates potential B corporations using the BIA, which looks at issues
of corporate accountability, employee policy, products’ benefit to consumers, the company’s
relationship with its community, and its impact on the environment. The assessment
contains a total of two-hundred points, and companies must score eighty points to be
certified and granted access to the B Corp mark. B Lab also audits twenty percent of those
companies who qualify for B Corp certification every two years.”).
140. Esposito, supra note 136, at 696; see also Performance Requirements, CERTIFIED B
CORPORATIONS, http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp;
see also Reiser, supra note 139 at 601-02.
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of action against the company for enforcement purposes.141
Given the lack of any truly tangible benefits of B Corp
certification and absence of enforceability, the certification “offers only
moral, rather than legal, assurances to non-shareholder constituencies
and social interests.”142 As such, the most beneficial aspect of B Lab
certification lies in its branding value and marketing potential.143
Those closely following the development of B Corps believe that this
branding potential can have real a positive impact for companies by
attracting directors “committed to a blended mission and investors
willing to enforce it,” along with providing a “private regulatory
system to help enforce a blended enterprise’s dual mission.”144
2.

The California Benefit Corporation Framework

Benefit corporations, unlike their B Corp counterparts, find their
legal framework in a given state’s corporations code. California added
a section covering benefit corporations in its code in 2012 and it states
that, to become a benefit corporation, the entity must amend its articles
to contain a statement that the corporation is a benefit corporation.145
Moreover, the corporation must “have the purpose of creating a general
public benefit”146 and may also identify any number of “specific public
benefits.”147 The Code defines a “general public benefit” as “a material
positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, as
assessed against a third-party standard.”148 What this “third-party
standard” entails will be elaborated below.149 While the Code fails to
define what a “specific public benefit” consists of, it does offer a list of
examples150 and states generally that it is “[t]he accomplishment of
any . . . particular benefit for society or the environment.”151
The California Corporations Code also details a number of
interests a corporation’s directors and committees must consider in
discharging their duties, which, for our purposes, include “[t]he
141. Esposito, supra note 137 at 696.
142. Reiser, supra note 139 at 641-42.
143. Id. at 643.
144. Id.
145. Cal. Corp. Code §§ 14603(a), 14610(b) (West 2015).
146. Cal. Corp. Code §14610(a).
147. Cal. Corp. Code §14610(b).
148. Cal. Corp. Code §14601(c).
149. See infra note 151.
150. Cal. Corp. Code §14601(e)(1–7) (e.g., “Promoting economic opportunity for
individuals or communities beyond the creation of jobs in the ordinary course of business,”
“[p]roviding low-income or underserved individuals or communities with beneficial
products or services,” and “[i]ncreasing the flow of capital to entities with a public benefit
purpose”).
151. Cal. Corp. Code §14601(e)(7).
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employees and workforce of the benefit corporation,” “[t]he interests of
customers of the benefit corporation as beneficiaries of the general or
specific public benefit purposes,” and “community and societal
considerations,” among others.152 Furthermore, like B Lab, California
also requires benefit corporations to provide shareholders with an
annual benefit report.153 This report includes details about the progress
the company made regarding its general and specific benefits and also
an “assessment of the overall social and environmental performance of
the benefit corporation, prepared in accordance with a [consistently
applied] third-party standard.”154
Throughout the relevant statute, references are made to a “third
party standard” against which benefit assessment and reporting are
gauged.155 The “third party” charged to develop this standard cannot
have a “material financial relationship with the benefit corporation or
any of its subsidiaries,” and must have the requisite knowledge “to
assess overall corporate social and environmental performance” using a
“multistakeholder approach.”156 The Code highlights the need for
transparency in the third party’s evaluations, ensuring that information
regarding the standard is publicly available.157
In practice, the third party standard is very similar to the standard
set by B Lab for B Corp certification. B Lab is, in fact, the most
prevalent third party standard setter for benefit corporations seeking
third parties to fulfill state statutory requirements like those in the
California Corporations Code.158 Meeting a given statute’s “limited
transparency and independence requirements” is not considered a
difficult barrier to clear, and other standard setters and entity
certification programs besides B Lab may also qualify.159
152. Cal. Corp. Code §14620(b)(1–7).
153. Cal. Corp. Code §14630(a) .
154. Cal. Corp. Code §14630 (a)(2).
155. Cal. Corp. Code §14601(g) (defining the third party standard as “a standard for
defining, reporting, and assessing overall corporate social and environmental performance”).
156. Cal. Corp. Code § 14601(g)(2–3).
157. Cal. Corp. Code § 14601(g)(4).
158. Mitch Nass, The Viability of Benefit Corporations: An Argument for Greater
Transparency and Accountability, 39 IOWA J. CORP. L. 875, 884 (2014); see also Reiser,
supra note 139, at 602 (describing the “third party standard-setter role” as “tailor-made for
B Lab”); but see Benefit Corporations: Hearing on AB 361 Before Assembly Judiciary
Committee (May 3, 2011) (raising the concern that “B Lab is ‘uniquely positioned’ to take
advantage of the [statute] . . . and will become the principal certification agency of benefit
corporations qualified to form under the statute” to which B Lab responded saying that
“there are many third party standards organizations that meet the statutory criteria for a third
party standard. Some examples are: the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), GreenSeal,
Underwriters Laboratories (UL), ISO2600, and Green America . . .”).
159. Reiser, supra note 139, at 602–-603 (discussing the potential for certifiers of high
environmental performance to set third party standards, along with corporate governance
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The Benefit Enforcement Proceeding

The most impactful difference between B Corps and benefit
corporations lies in their enforcement mechanisms. As stated above,
aside from revoking B Corp status for failing to adhere to B Lab
benchmarks, there is little B Lab is empowered to do to enforce an
entity’s commitment to meet rigorous standards of social and
environmental performance, accountability, and transparency. This is
not entirely the case for statutorily authorized benefit corporations.
California’s code contains a provision allowing for a “benefit
enforcement proceeding,” a right of action which may be used in the
case a benefit corporation fails to “pursue the general public benefit
purpose of the benefit corporation or any specific public benefit
purpose set forth in its articles.”160 It may also be initiated if the entity
violates a “duty or standard of conduct imposed on a director,” or fails
to “deliver or post an annual benefit report.”161 The relevant statue also
states that these proceedings may only be brought either directly by the
benefit corporation itself, or derivatively, by a shareholder, director,
persons owning five percent or more of equity interest in the
corporation’s parent company, or those specified in the articles or by
laws of the corporation.162 Third-party beneficiaries of the benefit
corporation’s general or specific benefit purposes do not have standing
to sue.163 These proceedings primarily provide for injunctive relief164
and officers of the corporation are not liable for monetary damages for
the failure to discharge any obligations required of them by the
California benefit corporation statute165 —a court may only award costs
incurred in connection with the benefit enforcement proceeding,
including attorneys’ fees.166
B. The Opportunity Within Existing B Corp and Benefit Corporation
Framework To Combat Forced Arbitration
Recent studies estimate that the number of benefit corporations
nationally is nearing 2,000, with almost 120 in California alone.167
advisory firms, and product-focused standard-setters like Cradle to Cradle).
160. Cal. Corp. Code § 14601(b)(1), 14623.
161. Cal. Corp. Code § 14601(b)(2–3).
162. Cal. Corp. Code § 14623(b).
163. Cal. Corp. Code §§ 14622(d), 14623(a).
164. Benefit Corporations and Flexible Purpose Corporations in California: New State
Legislation Permits Socially Responsible Corporate Formations, JUSTICE & DIVERSITY
CENTER
OF
THE
BAR
ASSOCIATION
OF
SAN
FRANCISCO,
https://www.sfbar.org/forms/jdc/benefit-corp-memo%20.pdf.
165. Cal. Corp. Code § 14622(c).
166. Cal. Corp. Code § 14623(d).
167. Earth Day 2015: Does the Earth Benefit From Benefit Corporations? REUTERS,

248

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:57

With regards to B Lab certified B Corps, there are more than 1,200
nationally.168 These counts seem to suggest that these entities are
slowly but surely beginning to make their mark on the corporate
landscape. These companies are also usually bellwethers on social
issues and business trends—the “demonstration effect” explains that
“[b]enefit corp[oration]s show investors and entrepreneurs from every
industry what the future Fortune 500 looks and acts like.”169 Yet, in a
move that arguably runs counter to their public benefit commitment,
many benefit corporations also employ compelled arbitration clauses in
their contracts, even waiving the right for prospective plaintiffs to
resort to class procedures. For instance, a quick glance at the very
highly regarded benefit corporation Patagonia, reveals their own use of
these clauses and class action waivers.170 In the same way benefit
corporations and B Corps have used their growing power and influence
to affect positive change in topics from governance transparency to
sustainability and civic engagement, they should also begin to take a
leadership role in stemming the rapid explosion of forced arbitration
and class action waivers.
1.

Within B Corp Certification

There are several ways in which socially conscious entities like B
Corps and statutorily rooted benefit corporations can pivot towards
addressing employees’ and consumers’ diminished access to courts—
all without the added trouble of trying to amend existing law. This can
most easily be done with regards to B Lab’s B Corp certification
process—specifically, by way of the mandated B Impact Assessment
reports.171 These reports should be updated to assess a given
company’s use of contract terms like those compelling one-sided
(Apr,
14,
2015,
9:00
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSnMKWmB98da+1d0+MKW20150414; Ellen Berrey,
How Many Benefit Corporations Are There? UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO, SUNY (May 5,
2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2602781 (numbers do not include several states that have
very recently passed benefit corporation legislation, and many states that have previously
done so do not track benefit corporation creation).
168. Our 2016 Year in Review—and #2000BCorps! B LAB (January 5, 2017),
https://medium.com/@bthechange/our-2016-year-in-review-and-2000bcorps3f2acc03d1ff#.xr76nkrxa.
169. Why is Benefit Corp Right for Me? BENEFIT CORPORATION,
http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/why-become-benefit-corp.
170. Terms
of
Use
(July
8,
2014),
PATAGONIA,
http://www.patagonia.com/us/patagonia.go?assetid=104582 (“Any dispute relating in any
way to your visit to Patagonia or to products you purchase through Patagonia shall be
submitted to confidential arbitration.”) (“[N]o arbitration under this Agreement shall be
joined to an arbitration involving any other party subject to this Agreement, whether through
class arbitration proceedings or otherwise.”).
171. See supra Part IV(A).
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arbitration with grossly unfair terms and forbidding aggregated action.
Companies trying to become B Lab certified but using these legal
maneuvers to evade civil litigation should be docked a sufficient
number of points on their final assessment reports by B Lab.
Every two years, B Lab updates and improves its alreadythorough BIA report in conjunction with assessment users,
stakeholders, and B Lab’s Standards Advisory Council.172 This is done
to “incorporate user feedback, improve clarity and content, and stay up
to date with market practices and social and environmental issues.”173
The most recent edition of the assessment, Version 5.0, was released in
January 2016; Version 6.0 will be released in 2018 and will “involve a
more comprehensive methodological review of the BIA and its
scoring.”174 The assessment revision cycle begins after a given version
is rolled out, with B Lab collecting feedback on areas and ways that
edition can be improved.175 B Lab uses this information to create a
revised draft of the BIA “for initial review and testing” 176 and includes
reviews by the Standards Advisory Council.177 Thereafter, a private
beta testing of the new assessment begins, followed by a public
comment period.178
Since Version 6.0 will involve a more thorough review of the
assessment and scoring weights, this presents a wonderful opportunity
for the inclusion of questions in the assessment that probe into an

172. Version 5 of the B Impact Assessment coming January 2016, THE BLOG –
CERTIFIED B CORPORATIONS (Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.bcorporation.net/blog/version5-of-the-b-impact-assessment-coming-january-2016.
173. Public Comment Period for Draft B Impact Assessment Version 5.0, THE BLOG –
CERTIFIED B CORPORATIONS (Oct. 25, 2015), https://www.bcorporation.net/blog/publiccomment-period-draft-b-impact-assessment-version-50.
174. Version 5 of the B Impact Assessment coming January 2016, THE BLOG –
CERTIFIED B CORPORATIONS (Aug. 24, 2015),
https://www.bcorporation.net/blog/version-5-of-the-b-impact-assessment-coming-january2016.
175. Id. (stating that between Version 4.0 in January 2014 and Version 5.0 in January
2016, over 3,000 individual pieces of feedback for updates was provided).
176. Id.
177. Standards
Advisory
Council,
CERTIFIED
B
CORPORATIONS,
http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps/standardsadvisory-council (The Standards Advisory Council is “an independent committee of 20–22
members, each respected in the field for their wisdom and with deep industry or stakeholder
expertise. The Standards Advisory Council is divided into two subgroups—one to oversee
the content and weightings for the version of the B Impact Ratings System that is
appropriate for companies and funds in developed markets; the other for the version that is
appropriate for companies and funds in emerging markets.”).
178. Version 5 of the B Impact Assessment coming January 2016, THE BLOG –
CERTIFIED B CORPORATIONS (Aug. 24, 2015),
https://www.bcorporation.net/blog/version-5-of-the-b-impact-assessment-coming-january2016.
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entity’s use of arbitration and class action waivers. Before the next
version is rolled out, the Standards Advisory Council, whose members’
information is publicly available online, should be lobbied and
presented with evidence regarding the dangerous proliferation of
arbitration and post-Concepcion class action waivers. Employees and
consumers alike should be mobilized to participate heavily when public
comments are opened as well.179
Alternatively, B Lab could also work closely with institutions like
the CFPB, which are already active in addressing forced arbitration and
class action waivers, to create an addendum to the BIA dealing with
those essential issues.180 For instance, in 2014, B Lab created an
addendum to the assessment dealing with new higher education
standards.181 The addendum included “targeted questions to measure
for-profit postsecondary providers’ unique impact—for instance, who
they serve, how they serve them, and what positive outcomes are
produced.182 This addition was developed closely with numerous
higher education institutions that are familiar with the industry.183
Whether by way of an addendum to the assessment or a new
version entirely, including questions for companies seeking
certification that force them to disclose, in a detailed manner, their use
of arbitration and waiver clauses would fit comfortably with the
existing B Lab mission and framework. B Lab champions a
commitment to all stakeholders, not merely business shareholders184—
workers and consumers being subjected to an unfair flavor of “justice”
are unquestionably fundamental stakeholders, regardless of how one
may define that loaded term.
The B Corp Declaration of
Interdependence also states that the organization believes that “all
business ought to be conducted as if people . . . mattered” and that
“through their products, practices, and profits, businesses should aspire
to do no harm and benefit all.”185 Preventing unfair, one-sided
arbitration and plaintiffs from benefitting from class action procedures
would go a long way towards benefitting the average person trying to
vindicate his or her rights.

179. See supra text accompanying note 115 (this would provide an excellent opportunity
and arena to present the CFPB’s most recent report).
180. See supra text accompanying note 115.
181. Call for Public Comment: New Higher Education Standards, THE BLOG –
CERTIFIED B CORPORATIONS (Aug. 10, 2015),
https://www.bcorporation.net/blog/call-public-comment-new-higher-education-standards.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. The
B
Corp
Declaration,
CERTIFIED
B
CORPORATIONS,
https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-b-corp-declaration.
185. Id.
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Moreover, the BIA already has an entire section devoted to
analyzing a company’s commitment to the betterment of its workers,
and including the pertinent topics discussed here would fit very
naturally within that part of the assessment.186 Aside from asking about
the nature and presence of waivers and arbitration clauses in a
company’s contracts, questions could also probe into how a company
educates its employees about their available contractual legal remedies
prior to official employment. Expanding the scope of the BIA in this
manner allows B Lab to better and more completely gauge a
company’s negative social impact, and in turn, would also make B Lab
a far better “third party standard” for the benefit corporation.
2.

Within the California Statutory Benefit Corporation
Framework

The existing California benefit corporation statute also presents an
enticing opportunity for holding businesses incorporated as such
accountable for failing to offer their workers and customers fair access
to the court system. One way to do this is through the interpretation of
statutory definitions. The definition of a general public benefit focuses
on an entity’s “material positive impact on society” which can very
easily be interpreted to include social justice issues like employees’
access to the court system.187 This general public benefit is still
“assessed against a third-party standard,” meaning that organizations
like B Lab would still have enormous influence in deciding whether a
company has followed its general public benefit—making the
discussion in the preceding section all the more relevant.188 Of course,
as far as a corporation’s optional “specific public benefit” is concerned,
whether or not this encompasses the use of forced arbitration or not is
wholly dependent on what that specific public benefit is.189 For
instance, a benefit corporation can easily choose to list “fair employee
access to courts,” or “giving consumers and employees the option to
forgo arbitration” as one of its specific benefits.
Another provision of the California benefit corporation statute
bearing heavily on a business’s use of unfair contracts to limit
plaintiffs’ access to courts is Section 14620, governing the duties of an

186. Preview
the
Assessment,
B
IMPACT
ASSESSMENT,
http://blab.force.com/bcorp/impactassessmentdemo?id=a03C000000ISIohIAH.
187. Cal. Corp. Code § 14601(c).
188. Cal. Corp. Code § 14601(c).
189. Cal. Corp. Code § 14610(b) (stating that a corporation “may identify one or more
specific public benefits that shall be the purpose or purposes of the benefit corporation”)
(emphasis added).
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entity’s directors.190 This section mandates that in discharging their
duties, those in charge must consider the impact of any action on the
workforce and the “interests of customers of the benefit corporation as
beneficiaries of the general or specific public benefit purposes of the
benefit corporation.”191 These individuals must also take into account
impacts on broader community and societal considerations.192
Together, these considerations suggest that those empowered to make
substantive decisions regarding contracts within a benefit corporation
must also take into account the impact on employees’ and consumers’
access to the courts—unfairly constructed contracts disadvantaging
these groups or preventing them from access to certain judicial
remedies would seem to directly clash with these obligations.
Section 14630, governing the compulsory distribution of annual
benefit reports to a benefit corporation’s shareholders, also has the
potential to be able to hold these corporations accountable for how they
decide to draw up their contracts.193 Since entities must already
describe “[t]he ways in which the benefit corporation pursued a general
public benefit during the applicable year and the extent to which that
general public benefit was created,”194 the corporation should also have
to disclose the ways in which its contracts are drawn. The section also
states that, in accordance with the third-party standard, the report
should also include “[a]n assessment of the overall social and
environmental performance of the benefit corporation,” 195 which is yet
another opportunity for the corporation to disclose information about
its contracts.
Considering these opportunities for reflection on a company’s
impact on court access, the problem of enforcement remains. Even if a
shareholder agrees that fair contract construction, without clauses
waiving class litigation or forcing arbitration on unwilling parties,
should be considered as a part of a benefit corporation’s societal
impact—so what? A benefit corporation, given the benefits individual
arbitration provides to them, would still simply choose to omit these
considerations while still reaping the positive branding effect of being
labeled a benefit corporation. This is where the “benefit enforcement
proceeding” has the potential to exert power that has been, up until
now, dormant.196

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See Cal. Corp. Code § 14620(b).
Cal. Corp. Code § 14620(b)(2–3).
Cal. Corp. Code § 14620(b)(4).
See Cal. Corp. Code § 14630(b).
Cal. Corp. Code § 14630(a)(1)(B).
Cal. Corp. Code § 14630(a)(2).
See supra Part IV(A)(3).
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These proceedings can be brought if a benefit corporation fails to
pursue its general, or specific, public benefits.197 It may also be
brought if a director violates a duty imposed on him or her by the
benefit corporation statute.198 Given this, its seems plausible that such
a proceeding could be initiated against a benefit corporation for failing
to consider the impact of unfair, one-sided contracts, due to their
harmful contributions to society199—especially taking into account the
fact that Section 14620 obligates directors to consider the impact of
their actions on employees and customers.200 For example, consider a
shareholder of a benefit corporation that uses contracts of adhesion
with compelled arbitration, who is devoted to resolving the plight of
employees that are so subjected. She could initiate a benefit
enforcement proceeding against the corporation itself for acting
contrary to the general public benefit, or against a director who signed
off on the final form of these contracts. If victorious, a judge could
perhaps issue an injunction on that entity’s use of those contracts.
Of course, there are several limitations on the ability to bring these
proceedings, and the impact even a successful outcome might have
remains questionable. For one, benefit enforcement proceedings can
only be commenced by those within the benefit corporation, e.g.,
shareholders, directors, and others authorized to do so by the entity’s
articles of incorporation.201 Also, the corporation is not liable for any
monetary damages, making it difficult to punish a corporation where it
truly hurts: their pockets.202 Even if a plaintiff is successful in getting
his or her case for benefit enforcement heard before a judge, there is a
good chance discussion of the “business judgment rule” will dominate
hearings.203 Since any proceeding will likely be an issue of first
impression, judges will also have to wrestle with determining burdens
197. Cal. Corp. Code § 14601(b)(1).
198. Cal. Corp. Code § 14601(b)(2).
199. See Cal. Corp. Code § 14601(c) (describing that a benefit corporation must pursue a
general public benefit defined as “material positive impact on society and the environment,
taken as a whole, as assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and
operations of a benefit corporation”).
200. See Cal. Corp. Code § 14620(b)(2–3).
201. Cal. Corp. Code § 14623(b).
202. See Cal. Corp. Code § 14623(c).
203. Nass, supra note 158, at 891-92; see also Cal. Corp. Code § 309 (describing
principles of the business judgment rule: “(a) A director shall perform the duties of a
director, including duties as a member of any committee of the board upon which the
director may serve, in good faith, in a manner such director believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation and its shareholders and with such care, including reasonable
inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar
circumstances . . . (c) A person who performs the duties of a director in accordance with
subdivision (a) and (b) shall have no liability based upon any alleged failure to discharge the
person’s obligations as a director”).
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of proof and resolving questions of just what kind of evidence would
be sufficient to prove that benefit corporation has strayed from its
commitments. And, of course, Concepcion’s pro-arbitration mandate
would still cast an especially large shadow on any decision a court
would make.
Issues notwithstanding, benefit enforcement proceedings still
represent the only potentially viable, statutorily sanctioned means for
enforcing a benefit corporation’s obligations—and the only way to get
one small but growing segment of the business community to be
accountable for the way in which its agreements are crafted. While we
may have ideas about how a proceeding might go, we cannot know for
sure without any established precedent.
Obviously, the best scenario would be for benefit corporations and
B Corps to recognize for themselves the precarious legal situation they
have placed workers and consumers through the use of arbitration and
class action waivers. As discussed above, committing themselves to
fairer contract standards would mesh nicely with existing benefit
corporation missions and obligations. Doing so may also have
beneficial consequences for the corporation as a whole. For one,
investors today are already seeking the kind of open and transparent
qualities that make a modern corporation a force for good—taking a
leadership position on a social justice issue receiving increased
publicity and attention like forced arbitration could serve to re-energize
investors.204
In the case a benefit corporation or B Corp has chosen to commit
itself to allowing consumers of its products and its workers fair and
equitable access to the court system, several substantive steps can be
taken towards accomplishing this. The cleanest way would be to draft
clauses allowing claimants a choice between arbitration and litigation.
Alternatively, unnecessary legal jargon could be avoided, and sections
of contracts pertaining to claims resolution could be removed and
included in an entirely separate document, requiring a separate

204. See Why do Investors Like Benefit Corporations?, BENEFIT CORPORATION
http://benefitcorp.net/investors/who-investing-benefit-corps (Jan 13, 2016) (quoting
Investment Rules 2.0: nonfinancial and ESG reporting trends, ERNST & YOUNG,
http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Specialty-Services/Climate-Change-and-SustainabilityServices/EY-tomorrows-investment-rules-2) (“64% of investors say businesses do not
adequately disclose non-financial risks and nearly half of investors would rule out
investment based on certain non-financial disclosures”); Investment Rules 2.0: nonfinancial
and ESG reporting trends, ERNST & YOUNG, http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/SpecialtyServices/Climate-Change-and-Sustainability-Services/EY-tomorrows-investment-rules-2
(“Nearly two-thirds of respondents indicat[ed] that issuers are not adequately disclosing
environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks.”).
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signature.205 This would serve to bring more attention to those relevant
provisions mandating arbitration or waiving class actions. Parties
bringing claims could also be given the freedom to elect the arbitration
agency, and costs incurred as a result of electing arbitration could be
paid by the defending corporation. Furthermore, agreements could
“provide for a neutral arbitrator, allow discovery, and provide for a
written decision by the arbitrator to allow judicial review.”206 Short
educational programs could also be instituted by businesses informing
“employees on their legal rights and how these can be enforced through
the arbitration process.”207
C. A Drop in the Bucket, or Something More?
Even if benefit corporation standards and B Corp certification
could be altered in a way to incorporate a commitment to more
equitable contracts allowing for fairer access to courts, would this
make a real difference? In the short run, it would probably not lead to
any substantive changes in the way the vast majority of businesses
draft their contracts; businesses are unlikely to give up their
competitive advantage in the private claim resolution system simply
due to the moral imperatives of a relatively small sliver of companies.
However, in the long run and due to their growing relevance, public
benefit corporations do have the potential to facilitate a more
substantive pivot by the business community at large toward tackling
issues with compelled arbitration.
Larger, more globalized benefit corporations and B Corps are
slowly beginning to emerge in the media and public eye. The likes of
Patagonia,208 Ben & Jerry’s,209 Seventh Generation,210 New Belgium
205. See Lorene Park, Be loud, clear, and fair in arbitration provisions or be prepared
to
litigate,
WOLTERS
KLUWER
(Aug.
7,
2012),
http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/2012/08/07/be-loud-clear-and-fair-inarbitration-provisions-or-be-prepared-to-litigate/ (“Require signatures, including on the page
with the arbitration provision. It is better to have an employee sign to agree to arbitration
rather than using an opt-out agreement where the employee is deemed to agree unless he or
she takes action to opt out.”).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Timm Herdt, Patagonia first in line to register as a ‘benefit corporation’,
VENTURA COUNTY STAR (Jan. 3 2012),
http://archive.vcstar.com/business/patagonia-first-in-line-to-register-as-a-benefitcorporation-ep-364053739-352192261.html.
209. Ben & Jerry’s Joins the B Corp Movement! BEN & JERRY’S,
http://www.benjerry.com/about-us/b-corp.
210. Seventh Generation Receives B Corp Recertification! SEVENTH GENERATION (Jan
13, 2015),
http://www.seventhgeneration.com/learn/blog/seventh-generation-receives-b-corprecertification.
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Brewing Co. Inc.,211 Method Products,212 Warby Parker,213 and Plum
Organics214 are already well-known benefit corporations and B Corps.
In the multinational corporation arena, consumer goods giant Unilever
is working with B Lab to pave the way for its own path to becoming
the world’s largest publicly traded B Corp.215 Unilever itself was
perhaps inspired by Brazil’s foremost cosmetics, fragrance, and
toiletries maker, Natura, which became “the largest—and first publicly
traded—company to attain B Corp sustainability certification” in
2014.216 Etsy, another well-known B Corp specializing in handicrafts
e-commerce, became the second B Corp to successfully IPO in April
2015, with shares sky rocketing 88% after it became publicly listed.217
All of these companies show that not only are B Corps and benefit
corporations here to stay, but that their structures are viable, financially
strong, and growing in relevance. If these companies adopted
provisions in their articles of incorporation committing them to giving
their workers fair access to the public court system and aggregative
litigation, or interpreted their general and/or specific benefits to do so,
this would create real and very impactful waves.
V. CONCLUSION
There is a great and growing need for incorporating access to
justice into conventional understandings of social responsibility and the
public benefit. As of now, these perceptions completely fail to address
the detrimental effect arbitration, driven by judicial interpretation, is
having on a plaintiff’s prospects for successful litigation against
211. New Belgium Brewing Co, Inc., CERTIFIED B CORPORATIONS,
https://www.bcorporation.net/community/new-belgium-brewing-co-inc.
212. Method
Products,
CERTIFIED
B
CORPORATIONS,
https://www.bcorporation.net/community/method-products-pbc.
213. Warby
Parker,
CERTIFIED
B
CORPORATIONS,
https://www.bcorporation.net/community/warby-parker.
214. Plum
Organics,
CERTIFIED
B
CORPORATIONS,
https://www.bcorporation.net/community/plum-organics.
215. Jo Confino, Will Unilever become the world’s largest publicly traded B corp? THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2015, 10:34 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainablebusiness/2015/jan/23/benefit-corporations-bcorps-business-social-responsibility; see also
Unilever, Multinationals, and the B Corp Movement, THE BLOG – CERTIFIED B
CORPORATIONS
(Sept.
29,
2015),
https://www.bcorporation.net/blog/unilevermultinationals-and-the-b-corp-movement.
216. Jo Confino, Will Unilever become the world’s largest publicly traded B corp? THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2015, 10:34 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainablebusiness/2015/jan/23/benefit-corporations-bcorps-business-social-responsibility.
217. Matt Egan, Etsy now worth over $3 billion. Stock jumps 88% after IPO, CNN
MONEY (Apr. 16, 2015, 11:11 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/15/investing/etsy-ipo-16-a-share-wall-street/;
see
also
Dennis Price, How Etsy’s IPO Could Spark Investor Interest in B Corps, ENTREPRENEUR
(Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/243162.
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powerful and vested business interests. But if companies like those
mentioned above can prove that the average consumer cares about how
the business he or she buys a product from, treats its workers with
regards to claim resolution, the conventional corporation will also
slowly integrate these principles into how it runs its business. This has
already been exemplified with regards to many issues that socially
conscious companies have championed that have found their way into
mainstream business practices—issues once never thought to emerge as
vital in a cut-throat, competitive, and capitalist society concentrated on
profit generation at all costs. It is now time for businesses to finally
take steps to prioritize access to courts as a social cause they can be
proud in championing.

